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SOME POLITICAL LESSONS OF THE ISTANBUL "OIL AND GAS SUMMIT" OF OSCE
18 December 1999
The significance of the agreements on the construction of the Baku - Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Transcaspian gas pipeline, signed in Istanbul, is not confined to the energy
sector only. Those agreements will strongly impact the political game both in Russia and in the whole region of the Black and Caspian Seas. The choice has been made: the
"main" oil and gas will go via Turkey. However, problems remain for the "winners", and hopes are still alive for the "losers". The fate of the Ukrainian project Odesa - Brody
depends not on assurances of support for the project, but on the signing of concrete international agreements.
A BIT OF HISTORY MIXED WITH PSYCHOANALYSIS
The 20th century is coming to a close. It was the century where human life was greatly dependent on oil. While Sigmund Freud explained human behavior with sexual inclination
(libido), the behavior of many countries in the 20th century may be explained with "oil inclination". The century to come won't bring about the deficit of hydrocarbons, but the
problems of energetic security will impact global economy still stronger. Both the beginning and the end of the 20th century witnessed tough confrontation between Russia and the
West, struggling for the control over the Caspian energy resources. Before World War One, the Russian and the western oil companies were fighting each other in the south of
the Russian Empire (the Apsheron Peninsula), aggravating the entire international situation. One of the rivaling parties was presented by a group of Russian companies led by the
"Oil Partnership of the Nobel Brothers", the other - by Rockfeller's "Standard Oil Co.", the Paris Bankers' House of the Rothschilds, and a number of British companies.
The substantiation of dozens of projects for the transportation of the Caspian oil and gas took a lot of time and huge money. Throughout this process, the United States has been
the main source of hopes, and their gravedigger, at a time. The US Department of Energy estimated the extractable reserves of Caspian oil at 27 billion tons, seeing the region as
an alternative to the Persian Gulf area. Today, it is clear that this approach was conditioned by the political considerations and excessive optimism. Geopolitical interests prevailed
over economics. In the first place, the West was trying to prevent the Russian domination and to isolate Iran. The latest optimistic estimates of the Caspian oil resources have
been more modest: 5-6 billion tons, or approx. 3% of the world resources. This figure is comparable to the North Sea reserves.
The main participant of the "project of the century", Azerbaijan, presently possesses oil export potential equal to less than 1/10 of the volume put in the agreements on the Baku -
Ceyhan project (50 million tons of oil a year). The project will be unprofitable without the attraction of the Kazakh and, possibly, Turkmen oil. The minimum quality of oil to be
supplied from Kazakhstan makes some 20 million tons, which is impractical so far; large supplies from Turkmenistan are not feasible either. Given the deficit of oil for the main
export pipeline (Baku - Ceyhan), all talk of the practical implementation of other projects (including the Ukrainian route) is premature.
Low estimated profitability of the project became another reason for pessimism, including among the potential investors into the Baku - Ceyhan project. It is conditioned by the
high cost of the Caspian oil extraction (2-3 times higher than for the Iraqi oil), huge costs of the pipeline construction ($2.4 billion), tough environmental limitations, security of the
route, and some other factors.
The American bubble of the huge oil resources and multiplicity of options for Caspian pipeline routes (officially ruling out only the Iranian direction) blew up. Nevertheless, today
nobody questions the availability of oil and gas in the Caspian region, or the expediency of their extraction.
The idea of the Baku - Ceyhan pipeline, put forward by the Turkish company "Botas" seven years ago and supported by the Clinton Administration in 1995, began to take shape
after unprecedented lobbying.
The signing of the Declaration on the Transcaspian gas pipeline, designed to supply Turkmen gas to Turkey and Europe via Azerbaijan and Georgia, was one of the most
important events of the Istanbul summit. The pipeline worth $2.5-3 billion will pump up to 30 billion cubic meters of gas, making it a competitor to Russia's "Blue Stream" Black
Sea project. So far, the Transcaspian project noticeably lags behind its rival, whose preparatory work has been almost finished. Experts see implementation of both pipeline
projects at a time inexpedient.
The documents signed in Istanbul lay the basis for the construction of both the Baku - Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Transcaspian gas pipeline, although further substantiation of
their commercial viability is required. Therefore, the political stage of the creation of the energy bridge from the Caspian Sea to Europe via Turkey has been completed. Whether
the pipelines are constructed or not, the directions for co-operation determined by the presidents of the involved countries will remain unchanged.
Ukraine is the only country among the main supposed "backstage players" struggling for a share in the "main" Caspian oil (apart from Romania and Bulgaria), which began its way
to diversification of oil supply with practical steps. In 1993 the Kuchma government adopted a resolution on the construction of a new oil terminal near Odesa. The construction of
the entire infrastructure has been going on with varying success. Today, the fate of the Ukrainian strategic project Odesa - Brody is being decided, without noticeable opposition on
the part of the key players in the Caspian project (the USA, Azerbaijan, etc.). Implementation of the Ukrainian project will depend on the activity and correct decisions by Ukraine's
leadership.
The historic heritage of statesmen is always evaluated proceeding from their contribution to the resolution of major problems. Will Ukraine produce politicians whose contribution
will be measured not only by deposits in foreign banks?
ON THE PIPE SECURITY, AND GUUAM
The security of pipelines is determined by their remoteness from potential conflict areas. Despite the general reduction in the manpower of the Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen
armies, the numerical strength of their forces deployed in the Caspian region rose more than two-fold.
Transportation of energy resources via the routes earmarked in Istanbul won't ensure high security, and under certain circumstances their construction and operation will be
endangered by conflicts fraught with serious local wars in the Black and Caspian seas region.
First, the Caspian Sea has not been delimited so far. The dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the ownership of oilfields persists.
Second, the conflicts in Chechnya, Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Kurdish problem in Turkey have not been contained or resolved.
Particular attention should be paid to the steady disintegration of the CIS, partially related with the development of the international association codenamed GUUAM (Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), which may also lead to conflicts.
The key idea behind the establishment of GUAM (at that stage without Uzbekistan) was the delivery of the Caspian energy resources to the European market. The latest events in
Istanbul and in GUUAM countries show a gradual shift from economic issues (transport corridors) to military and political ones. GUUAM was established with the US support, and
now its member countries closely co-operate with NATO within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" program, more and more shunning Russia. The Chechen war sharply
deteriorated Russia's relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, which took clearly pro-NATO position and basically wouldn't mind delegating the function of their defense to NATO. For
instance, Azerbaijan representatives more than once suggested guarding the not built yet oil pipeline Baku - Ceyhan by NATO units. Eduard Shevarnadze has declared Georgia's
intention to join NATO.
Is NATO capable today of resolving the whole range of problems in the Black and Caspian Sea region, whereas Russia will do everything to prevent NATO from entering the
region?
Ukraine has been expanding its military contacts with GUUAM countries. Consultations of Deputy Chiefs of the General Staffs of GUUAM countries were planned for December;
Ministers of Defense are set to meet in January, 2000. It should be noted that the co-operation in this sphere has been rather formal. Russia strongly opposes Ukraine's
participation in GUUAM, while its possible gradual transformation into a regional block, with a collective security system, may lead to complication of bilateral Ukrainian-Russian
relations. What are Ukraine's chances to solve its energy problems thanks to co-operation within GUUAM, at the expense of deteriorating relations with Russia?
LESSONS FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
The implementation of the agreements on the pipelines mentioned above will create the Caspian energy transportation corridor "East - West", which will involve serious
consequences for the world market of energy resources, for the regional security on NATO eastern borders and in eastern Europe, and for the energy security of the Black Sea
and Caspian region. Turkey may turn into a world energy center.
LESSON FOR RUSSIA
The Istanbul OSCE summit meant a political defeat for Moscow, in its struggle with the USA. The main political consequence of the signed oil and gas agreements is that the
young states of the Caspian region get beyond Russia's control, while the USA, on the contrary, will greatly strengthen its position. Russia's influence will weaken or vanish not
only in the Caucasus but also in the Central Asia. The Istanbul OSCE summit will bring significant economic losses for Russia, in the oil and gas sector.
Whereas the USA and Turkey have not become the main partners of the Caspian region states in the field of transportation of energy resources yet, and Russia still remains their
key partner, high probability of political and economic pressure exists, up to interrupting exports from those countries. Taking into account the considerable reduction in Russia's
military presence in Georgia and its complete withdrawal from Transdnistria, agreed to at the same Istanbul summit, Russia won't be able to afford initiation of conflicts in the
Black and Caspian Sea region. However, some western experts adhere to the contrary opinion.
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military presence in Georgia and its complete withdrawal from Transdnistria, agreed to at the same Istanbul summit, Russia won't be able to afford initiation of conflicts in the
Black and Caspian Sea region. However, some western experts adhere to the contrary opinion.
The implementation of the Transcaspian gas pipeline project will make the USA an important player on the Eurasian gas market, where the Americans previously were not actively
involved. Besides, the project is seen as a factor encouraging further estrangement of Turkmenistan from the Russian Federation, and weakening of the latter's positions in the
Eurasian gas market.
LESSON FOR THE USA
For the political and energetic security of the USA, the Istanbul agreements mean an important victory in the Caspian region, namely a successful completion of the first stage of
negotiations. Washington, however, will have to bring its victory to logical end, that is, to implement the Baku - Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Transcaspian gas pipeline projects. The
cost of the "final" victory has not been determined yet, and may appear too high to justify the set target.
LESSON FOR NATO
The Istanbul summit may considerably change the balance of power in the post-Soviet space not in Russia's favor. For NATO, it will mean total advance south of the Caucasus, as
most of the CIS southern states may appear under the alliance's control. The requirement for safety and security for the construction and operation of pipelines will accelerate
NATO's appearance in the Transcaucasus. Today, the positions of the USA and NATO in the region are very weak. Will they be able to oppose Russia, if it resorts to open
confrontation? The slightest unreasoned steps by NATO in the Caspian region may provoke inadequate response by Russia.
LESSON FOR GUUAM
Most political and economic issues vital for Ukraine were solved not within the framework of GUUAM, but on a bilateral basis. The OSCE summit called in question the background
idea behind the GUUAM formation: transportation of oil is very doubtful. What remains? The union of those offended by Russia? GUUAM's loss of its oil component will hardly
transform it into a military alliance, but may lead to its break-up. Maybe this "island of opposition" lacks Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? GUTUKAM? One way or the other, GUUAM
has long been "artificially breathed", and absence of urgent steps will doom it to rapid death.
LESSONS FOR UKRAINE
The Istanbul oil and gas agreement should serve a political and economic lesson for the country's leadership.
Lesson one. We have demonstrated our inability to effectively co-operate with CIS countries possessing large deposits of oil and gas. We've been rather active in political co-
operation with CIS countries, but this co-operation has not been backed by concrete economic actions (international agreements of exploration, extraction and transportation of
hydrocarbons) so far.
Lesson two. Signing of the agreement on the Baku - Ceyhan pipeline construction has decreased Ukraine's chances, already small, to implement its own project Odesa - Brody,
and, in case of its failure, will bring huge economic losses for the country. Ukraine began construction of the oil pipeline and the oil terminal in absence of at least framework
agreements with oil-exporting countries.
Lesson three. The implementation of the "Turkmen" Transcaspian gas pipeline may lead to Ukraine losing its only source of gas supply, alternative to Russian deliveries, and
Ukraine will stay face to face with "Gazprom" monopoly, which will dictate the conditions of deliveries.
Lesson four. Ukraine is still capable of implementing the Odesa - Brody project by attracting oil from several pipeline routes ending on the Black Sea shore, including Russian ones.
The fifth, and the major lesson. The time for illusions and "strategic" promises given by strategic partners has passed. It is time for change: qualitatively new approaches in policy
and economy, and new leaders are needed. Will they come? The answer to this question should be given by the new "old" President in the near future.
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